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Whether used to draw Iran into nuclear talks or condemn apartheid in
South Africa, economic sanctions have assumed an increasingly important role
in our national security strategy. For one thing, their effectiveness has grown
markedly, thanks to today's global financial interdependence. Moreover, in
light of this country's war-weariness, sanctions provide an alternative to the
use offorce. Given these two trends, the outsized role of economic sanctions in
our national security strategy is not surprising. What may surprise, however, is
the fact that sanctions remain under-enforced. This Note offers four innovative
solutions to that problem. Taken together our proposals demand greater
cooperation on the part of the private actors subject to sanctions as well as the
government branches that levy and enforce them. Along the way, our solutions
raise compelling questions about what role-if any- private citizens ought to
play in the traditionally public domain of national security. In the end, we don't
claim to have struck upon any fail-safe solutions to the problem of under-
enforcement. Rather, we hope to direct the conversation toward a sanctions
system that is both more economically efficient and more effective at achieving
our foreign policy objectives.
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Introduction
Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no
need for. force.
- Woodrow Wilson
Many of today's most urgent and challenging foreign policy problems lie
at the nexus of national security and economics. In recent years, the media
provided nearly constant coverage of the American-led effort to isolate Iran
financially in the hope of thwarting its nuclear program. And, as the crisis in
Ukraine reached a fever pitch following the downing of a commercial airliner
in July 2014, Washington called on Europe to impose tougher sanctions against
Russia. That counterterrorism policymakers are relying increasingly on
economic tools-and specifically sanctions-as an alternative to the use of
force is perhaps unsurprising, given today's global financial interdependence
and Americans' reluctance to pledge more troops to the war on terror.
The sanctions enforcement regime is a prominent tool in the U.S. foreign
policy arsenal, but it is also defective. With national security threats erupting in
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Eastern Europe, Congress often responds with
new rounds of sanctions, prompting the Treasury Department to add fresh
names to the swelling rolls of sanctioned entities. But robust sanctions regimes
require robust enforcement networks that "keep[] pace with legislation and
diplomatic developments."' Instead, the current enforcement networks are led
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by executive agencies whose efforts are hampered by resource constraints and
information deficits-debilities that sanctioned entities have recognized and
exploited.
Harnessing economic incentives to serve American foreign policy aims,
this Note offers four new proposals to improve the enforcement regime for
international financial sanctions. Together, these solutions suggest novel ways
to achieve greater buy-in from private actors subject to regulation and from
coordinating government branches, working toward a fully enforced sanctions
regime. The first two solutions enlist private actors to assist the government in
uncovering and prosecuting sanctions violations. We recommend that Congress
introduce qui tam provisions into the statutory sanctions regime and rely to a
greater extent on bounties for identifying violations of sanctions and other
counterterrorism regulations. The latter two proposals are more radical re-
imaginings of the enforcement regime. Here, we recommend the institution of
private ratings agencies for sanctions compliance, as well as a new liability
insurance schema for unintentional sanctions violations.
A common thread in all four proposals-and one that we believe offers a
comparative advantage over the current enforcement approach-is the
mobilization of the private sector. For a government incapable of sifting
through staggering volumes of daily financial transactions and pressured by
budget restrictions, employing the private sector taps into a unique repository
of valuable data in a cost-efficient way.2 To that end, our solutions call for
corporations and individuals to bear a good portion of front-end enforcement
costs.
Apart from the benefits of cost-conservation, partnering with the private
sector has been recognized as a vital, yet lacking, ingredient in effective
sanctions enforcement. As Patrick Fitzgerald writes:
The importance of enlisting non-governmental parties in the war on
terrorism ... is now more clear than ever but the devil is in the details. If these
programs are not properly implemented, the government's objectives may be
undermined or frustrated. Similarly, the burdens imposed on those who seek to
comply in good faith with the government's policies may be unnecessarily
increased if the regulatory controls are not properly crafted and administered.
1. Ramsey B. Jurdi, Iran Sanctions Enforcement Not Keeping Pace with Rhetoric,
CHADBOURNE & PARK LLP (Apr. 2013), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/1d463291-a830
-4cda-900b-8acle4e5eaf0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/973el7dd-d8d4-4d63-bc77-
91a51cO69072/lranSanctionsEnforcementAprl3.pdf; see also Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart
Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 957, 957 (2002) ("[T]here is a significant
difference between simply serving political goals by announcing sanctions, and promulgating controls
that are actually effective in combating terrorism.").
2. Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships
in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 901, 902 (2008).
3. Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 960. Fitzgerald also observes that resource constraints
"constitute one the most significant institutional impediments to more effective sanctions." Id. at 962.
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Our Note tackles the devilish details. We offer solutions that incentivize
the private sector to enforce sanctions and report wrongdoing, while also
providing protection to good-faith actors. Taken together, our proposals realign
the regulated community and the regulators as allies rather than adversaries in
an effort to overcome what has been described as one of the greatest obstacles
to effective sanctions enforcement.4
Also important, our proposals aim to amplify the legislature's voice in the
national security conversation, calling for statutory solutions to the under-
enforcement of sanctions. In creating a greater role for Congress, we speak to
the growing concern over the unchecked power of the post-9/11 presidency.5
As our proposals would be implemented by statute, they would provide a
legislative imprimatur to the informal practice of public-private collaboration in
intelligence gathering that has, until recently, flown largely under the radar.6 By
enshrining in statute the role that private actors are already encouraged to play
in uncovering sanctions violations, policymakers may enhance-or at the very
least clarify-the privacy protections guaranteed to Americans in their financial
transactions. Indeed, scholars have noted that the simple requirement of
outlining and justifying an intelligence program before Congress or the courts
tends to lead to solutions that are more thorough and less susceptible to
executive overreach and ad hoc decisionmaking.7 Finally, enlisting Congress
may help streamline the sanctions regime by creating a coordinated and
complementary approach to counterterrorism with reduced risk of conflicting
legislative and executive policies.
Ultimately, it is our hope that by recruiting the regulated community and
calling for enhanced inter-branch oversight, a robust and accountable
enforcement effort will support the American sanctions regime. Currently,
under-enforcement and selective enforcement of sanctions diminish
government legitimacy both at home and abroad, threatening to "discredit our
normative and legal pleas for other nations and peoples to respect the rule of
law."8 In fact, Senators Chuck Schumer and John Kyl raised this very concern
in a letter sent to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Lamenting the Obama
Administration's lack of resolve in going after Chinese companies violating the
Iranian sanctions, the senators wrote:
4. Id. at 964.
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (2010); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010).
6. Michaels, supra note 2, at 904 (describing "handshake" agreements between
executive and private actors).
7. Id. at 933.
8. Id. at 932; see also Suzanne Maloney, Why "Iran Style" Sanctions Worked Against
Tehran (And Why They Might Not Succeed with Moscow), BROOKINGS, Mar. 21, 2014, http:!!
www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/03/21-iran-sanctions-russia-crimea-nuclear (underscoring




The Administration, by continuing to ignore blatant violations of our sanctions
laws by Chinese companies, has undermined our sanctions regime in Iran. It has
sent the message to our friends and allies-many of which have taken difficult
steps to reduce their economic ties with Iran-that others will be let off the
hook.9
The rest of this Note proceeds as follows. We consider in Part I the origins
of the modem sanctions regime. With reference to several decades of sanctions
programs, we recount the implementation of sanctions as a tool of foreign
policy. We then identify the particular problems with current sanctions
enforcement, specifically focusing on the costs of unprosecuted violations and
the reasons for under-enforcement. Part II offers an in-depth look at the four
proposed improvements to the sanctions regime. None of our four solutions is
perfect, and we do not suggest that a flawless enforcement regime is realizable.
Rather, as we make clear in our Conclusion, our aim is to start a conversation
toward developing a sanctions system that is more economically efficient and
more effective at achieving our foreign policy objectives.
I. Origins of the Sanctions Regime and a Brief Survey of Its Use as a Foreign
Policy Tool
A. Statutory Authorization and Application
While the use of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
dates back to the War of 1812, the current sanctions regime is largely an
outgrowth of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA).1 0 Intended to regulate executive emergency powers during peacetime,
IEEPA authorizes the President to declare the existence of "an unusual and
extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of
the United States," and to regulate financial transactions with foreign entities
pursuant to that threat." The Act grants the President power to "investigate,
regulate, or prohibit" any transactions in foreign exchange, any payments or
9. Letter from Senators John Kyl & Chuck Schumer to Sec'y of State Hillary Clinton
(Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.legistorm.com/stormfeed/view-rss/368446/member/85.html.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
1701-1706 (2012)).
11. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 202, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (2012)). Concerned by executive overuse of the authority to declare national emergencies,
Congress passed IEEPA to regulate the President's ability to exercise that power during peacetime. See
Jarred 0. Taylor, III, Information Wants to be Free (of Sanctions): Why the President Cannot Prohibit
Foreign Access to Social Media Under U.S. Export Regulations, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 297, 306
(2012). To that end, the President must also declare a national emergency under the National
Emergencies Act (NEA) in order to declare a state of emergency under IEEPA. 50 U.S.C § 1621 (2006).
In turn, the NEA imposes a further requirement: the President must specify the provisions of law upon
which she bases a declaration of emergency. In addition, she must publish in the Federal Register and
transmit to Congress a declaration announcing the continuation of any state of emergency lasting beyond
one year.
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credit transfers that involve American banking institutions, and the import and
export of currency or securities.12 Alternatively, the President may block or
"freeze" the assets or bank accounts of any foreign entity held in the United
States3 Finally, penal provisions of IEEPA mandated civil penalties up to
$10,000. Criminal penalties included fines not exceeding $50,000, a ten-year
prison term, or both, for willful violations of the Act.'4 Subsequent
amendments to IEEPA have augmented those penalties, increasing civil fines to
$250,000 or twice the illegal transaction amount. Willful violators of the Act
may face up to $1,000,000 in criminal fines, a twenty-year prison sentence, or
both.'5
With each declaration of national emergency, the President has delegated
his authority under IEEPA to the Treasury Department, which in turn has
tasked the Office of Foreign Asset Control ("OFAC") with promulgating and
updating sanctions prohibiting Americans from engaging in financial
transactions with named counterparties.'6 Notwithstanding today's focus on
Iran, OFAC has levied sanctions against dozens of foreign nations, entities, and
individuals found to present "unusual and extraordinary" threats.17 For
example, in October 1985, President Reagan issued an executive order
announcing a national emergency with respect to the government of South
Africa, where it was determined that "the policy and practice of apartheid
[were] repugnant to the morals and political values of democratic and free
societies" and presented a threat to American interests.'8 Pursuant to President
Reagan's order, OFAC promulgated sanctions to prohibit U.S. financial
institutions from loaning money to the South African government or any
entities under its control. Likewise, in 1986 President Reagan responded to the
Libyan-backed terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna with an executive order
declaring a state of national emergency against Libya, prompting OFAC to
administer the Libyan Sanctions Regulations.'9 Other countries targeted by
12. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a) (2012)). Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Patriot Act amended IEEPA,
granting the president still greater power to confiscate property of foreign entities presenting terrorist
threats to the United States. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 277
(2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2006)).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 203, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702 (2012)).
14. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 206, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1705 (2012)).
15. 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012).
16. Taylor, supra note 11, at 306-07.
17. Individuals and entities sanctioned by OFAC are known collectively as "Specially
Designated Nationals" (SDNs). OFAC maintains an updated list of SDNs that is separate from its
various regulations outlining country-specific prohibitions on trade. Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.treasury.gov
/ofac/downloads/tl I sdn.pdf.
18. Exec. Order No. 12532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36861 (Sept. 9, 1985).
19. Exec. Order No. 12543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (Jan. 7, 1986). The Libyan Sanctions




OFAC sanctions since 1977 include Angola,20 Myanmar,21 Iraq and Kuwait,22
Nicaragua,23 Panama,24 and Sudan.25
Apart from Cuba,2 6  Iran has been subject to perhaps the most
comprehensive U.S. sanctions regime, a program that continues to dominate
foreign policy conversations.2 7 In 1979, President Jimmy Carter responded to
the revolution in Iran and the American hostage crisis unfolding there with
Executive Order 12170, blocking all "property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and other controlled entities and the
Central Bank of Iran."28 In the 1980s, the United States imposed additional
sanctions against Iran, designed to stop what Washington believed to be Iran's
support of terrorism and, more broadly, to check its power in the Middle East.29
And, following the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in
Beirut, Lebanon, Secretary of State George Schultz declared Iran a state
sponsor of terrorism, a designation that triggered a wide range of sanctions,
including a ban on exports and sales of weapons, increased oversight on export
of dual-use goods, and restrictions on economic assistance.30  In 1987,
President Reagan, citing Iran's support for international terrorism and
"aggressive actions against non-belligerent shipping" in the Persian Gulf,
issued Executive Order 12613, which imposed an import embargo on goods of
Iranian origin.31 Upon President Reagan's declaration of an embargo, OFAC
of emergency against Libya nd imposed stronger sanctions that further restricted trade and travel
pursuant to the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. The declaration of emergency was lifted nearly
twenty years later, in 2004, by President George W. Bush. See Exec. Order No. 13357, 69 Fed. Reg.
56665 (Sept. 20, 2004).
20. Exec. Order No. 12865, 58 Fed. Reg. 51005 (Sept. 26, 1993).
21. Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (May 20, 1997).
22. Exec. Order No. 12722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31803 (Aug. 3, 1990).
23. Exec. Order No. 12513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18629 (May 1, 1985).
24. Exec. Order No. 12635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12134 (Apr. 8, 1988).
25. Exec. Order No. 13067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59989 (Nov. 3, 1997).
26. A complex statutory schema apart from IEEPA governed restrictions on trade with
Cuba.
27. See, e.g., John Hudson, Democratic Support for Iran Sanctions Shrinks, FOREIGN
POLICY, Jan. 28, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/democratic-support-for-iran-sanctions-
shrinks/; Deb Riechmann, Obama Could Ease Many Iranian Sanctions Without Congress, WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/obama-could-ease-many-
iranian-sanctions-without-congress/2015/04/16/90625446-e470-1 1 e4-aeOf-f8c46aa8c3a4_story.html.
28. Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 59989 (Nov. 14, 1979). President Carter's
order resulted in the freezing of close to $12 billion in Iranian assets. Patrick Clawson, Iran, in
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 85, 85 (Richard Haas ed., 1998).
29. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS I
(2013).
30. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Chapter 3: State Sponsors of
Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T STATE (July 31, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195547.htm.
31. Exec. Order No. 12613, 3 C.F.R. 256 (1987). Rather than IEEPA, President
Reagan cited the International Security and Development Act of 1985 as the statutory authority for the
embargo.
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promulgated the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR), which constitute the
most up-to-date prohibitions on U.S. trade with Iran.32
The 1990s witnessed a shift in sanctions objectives, turning from targeting
terrorism outright to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In March
1995, as a result of Iran's alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
President Clinton declared a new state of emergency and issued Executive
Order 12957, outlawing American involvement in Iran's petroleum industry.33
Two months later, Clinton announced Executive Order 12959, which further
tightened existing sanctions.34 In August 1997, Clinton signed Executive Order
13059, banning virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by U.S.
persons or institutions, wherever their location.35
Matching the executive effort over the past three decades, Congress has
augmented JEEPA with a host of new laws that strike at specific sectors of the
Iranian economy and, in some instances, apply extraterritorially. In 1996,
Congress passed the Iran Sanctions Act authorizing sanctions against foreign
firms investing in or trading with Iran's energy sector or weapons programs.36
Congress next urned its attention to deterring non-U.S. financial institutions
from transacting on behalf of Iranian banks.3 7 In 2010, it passed the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
(CISADA), authorizing the Treasury to prohibit or restrict foreign banks from
maintaining U.S. dollar correspondent accounts38 or payable-through accounts
for other non-U.S. financial institutions engaging in potentially sanctioned
activities. CISADA curtails sharply foreign banks' ability to conduct any U.S.
dollar transactions on behalf of Iranian or Iranian-linked banks. To implement
the financial provisions of CISADA, OFAC promulgated the Iranian Financial
Sanctions Regulations (IFSR).3 9 Financial institutions found to violate the
regulations are subject to the same penalties as those imposed by IEEPA, and
they also are at risk of losing access to the U.S. financial system. Most recently,
the National Defense Authorization Acts enacted in 2012 and 2013 have
authorized additional sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate a
"significant financial transaction" with sanctioned Iranian banks.40
32. 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2012).
33. Exec. Order No. 12957, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1995). Every March since 1995, U.S.
Presidents have affirmed that a state of emergency continues to exist with respect to Iran. KATZMAN,
supra note 29, at 21.
34. Exec. Order No. 12959, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1995).
35. Exec. Order No. 13059, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1997).
36. The legislation was originally titled the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.
Pub. L. No. 104-72, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
37. As already mentioned, by this time, U.S. persons had been banned from virtually
all trade with Iran-linked entities. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
38. Pub. L. No. 111-195, 123 Stat. 1312 (2010).
39. 31 C.F.R. pt. 561 (2014).
40. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239 §
1245, 126 Stat. 1978 (2013); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-




B. A Diplomatic Dead End?
As the country's reliance on economic warfare grows stronger still, it is
worth stepping back briefly to consider whether sanctions-even when fully
enforced-are a viable tool of diplomacy. While the focus of this Note is not on
whether sanctions are an optimal foreign policy strategy, we recognize that our
proposals would amount to little more than an academic exercise if sanctions
were a diplomatic dead end. Fortunately, recent experience has made clear that
targeted sanctions,41 particularly when combined with a credible threat of
military action, provide a worthwhile tool to achieve American foreign policy
aims.
To be sure, naysayers have long questioned the efficacy of economic
sanctions as an alternative to force. In 1997, Robert Pape argued, "there is little
valid social science support for claims that economic sanctions can achieve
major foreign policy goals."42 Especially in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq
in 2003, proponents of a traditional military invasion pointed to the futility of
sanctions and their unintended effects on innocent civilians. Referring to the
debates over the 2003 invasion, one popular magazine observed that "[i]n some
circles-mainly but not exclusively on the right-it became an item of faith
that the targets of the sanctions invariably find a way to get around them,
ignore them, or force their unfortunate citizens to bear the burden of them."
43
And finally, familiar skepticism about sanctions was voiced as the United
States and its allies ramped up sanctions against Iran. As one defense analyst
warned in 2012, "the history of sanctions shows they not only typically fail to
achieve their economic objectives but also rarely achieve their political goals,
such as getting a country to abandon its nuclear program or causing a regime to
fall." 44
Recent breakthroughs in negotiations with Iran, however, have quieted
some critics as economic prohibitions have proven to be an effective and
comparatively safe means of pursuing American diplomatic goals.4 5 Indeed,
few would question that the promise of relief from crippling U.S. sanctions
succeeded in bringing Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to the nuclear
41. As the name suggests, targeted or "smart" sanctions are levied against individuals,
entities, and organizations. In other words, they are designed to avoid inflicting financial harm or
humanitarian crises on civilian populations. See, e.g., Joy Gordon, Smart Sanctions Revisited, 25 ETHICS
& INT'L AFF. 315, 315 (2011).
42. Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L SECURITY 90,
106 (1997).
43. John Cassidy, Iran Nuke Deal: Do Economic Sanctions Work After All? NEW
YORKER (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/iran-nuke-deal-do-economic-
sanctions-work-after-all.
44. Ivan Eland, Iran Sanctions Won't Work, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/17/iran-sanctions-wont-work.
45. See, e.g., Maloney, supra note 8 (labeling Iran the "exemplar for successful
sanctions").
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negotiating table.4 6 According to one policy analyst, "the critics have it wrong.
The U.S.-led sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, along with deft
U.S. handling of the Arab uprisings, has put Iran's leaders into a corner."
Already by 2012, U.S. sanctions had reduced Iran's oil exports by as much as
40%.48 At the same time, Iranian citizens witnessing the rapid depreciation of
their currency and concomitant rise in prices expressed dissatisfaction with the
country's leaders.49
Still, detractors and skeptics remain.50 To them, our response is this:
whatever the wisdom of sanctions, they will continue to play an outsized role in
America's diplomatic strategy. As a result, policymakers have a basic interest
in ensuring that sanctions are enforced robustly and efficiently.
C. Shortfalls of the Current Regime
1. Budget Constraints
It is widely acknowledged in the press, in policy circles, and in the
academy that sanctions-particularly against Iran-are under-enforced. As
Ramsey Jurdi, a sanctions lawyer at Chadbourne & Parke LLP, wrote in 2013,
"[a] critical look at the US record of enforcement of sanctions against Iran
reveals that prosecutions and penalties are not keeping pace with legislation
and diplomatic developments."51 The problem is chiefly one of resource
constraints, as OFAC appears "hampered by a lack of resources to investigate
and prosecute sanctions violators."5 2
46. See, e.g., Uri Berliner, Crippled by Sanctions, Iran's Economy Key in Nuclear
Deal, NPR (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/11/25/247077050/crippled-by-sanctions-irans-
economy-key-in-nuclear-deal; Cassidy, supra note 43.




50. In particular, experts doubted that recent sanctions levied against Russia would
cause Vladamir Putin to change course. See, e.g., Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, Can Sanctions
Stop Putin? BROOKINGS (June 3, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/researchlarticles/2014/06/03-can-
sanctions-stop-putin-gaddy-ickes ("Sanctions thus lead to greater control by Putin over the economy.
They weaken the relatively independent and modem part of Russia's economy. They also reinforce
Putin's political power. They rally the public around Putin.... [O]ur current approach of dealing with
Russia by sanctions and isolation will not only fail to accomplish its immediate goal of stopping Putin in
Ukraine, but it will also be counterproductive to the more important, long-term objective of Russia's
evolution as a normal, modem, globally integrated country.").
51. Ramsey B. Jurdi, Iran Sanctions Enforcement Not Keeping Pace With Rhetoric,
CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP (Apr. 2013), http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/ld463291-
a830-4cda-900b-8acle4e5eafO/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/973el7dd-d8d4-4d63-bc77-
9la5lcG69072/lranSanctionsEnforcement Aprl3.pdf See generally Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing
"Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 957 (2002).




Senior Treasury officials have been lamenting OFAC's financial resource
constraints for years.53 Each year, OFAC receives several hundred leads, but
opens only about one hundred investigations, which result in around twenty
enforcement actions on average.54 Jurdi calls these numbers "surprisingly low
given the broad reach of sanctions and the political importance of the Iran
issue."5 s Indeed, a review of recent OFAC enforcement actions notes a
concentration in actions against large financial institutions and small trade-
related violations.56 Both categories of enforcement rely heavily on voluntary
disclosures as opposed to affirmative investigation by OFAC. Accordingly,
much of OFAC's latest success is driven by its receipt of prepackaged
enforcement actions rather than by complex cases initiated by the agency. And
the situation has worsened through the most recently completed fiscal year. In
fiscal year 2014, the continued effects of budget sequestration will likely result
in another eight percent cut to OFAC's budget.
2. Diplomatic Concerns
Constrained resources are not just financial. Diplomatic equities also must
be weighed. Even as Congress passes new sanctions every three to four months
on average,5 8 the State Department employs a diplomatic calculus that may call
for certain sanctions to be enforced halfheartedly or not at all. According to
Jurdi, "the State Department remains reluctant to step on diplomatic toes,
particularly those of China and India, through use of extraterritorial laws....
[Much recent sanctions] legislation has been either symbolic or used
sparsely."59 In other words, it's not just the money. Executive agencies'
diplomatic goals may conflict with congressional mandates and often make
sanctions enforcement more difficult. As noted above, Senators Schumer and
Kyl sent a letter upbraiding the State Department for blatantly under-enforcing
the Iranian sanctions against Chinese corporations. Whether dictated by limited
financial resources, diplomatic considerations, or both, under-enforcement or
53. See, e.g., TREASURY DEPARTMENT 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, C-SPAN (Apr. 5,
2011), http://www.c-span.org/video/?298848-1/treasury-department-2012-budget-request.
54. Jurdi, supra note 51, at 1. While emphasizing that OFAC "appears hampered by a
lack of resources to investigate and prosecute [sanctions] violators," Jurdi does not expressly attribute
OFAC's low enforcement numbers to its resource constraints. It may be the case that OFAC declines to
follow some leads simply because they are unpromising.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/OFAC-Recent-
Actions.aspx.
57. See FY 2014 Program Summary by Budget Activity, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/aboutfbudget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents/6.%20DO
%20BIB%20FINAL%20508%20ok.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
58. Jurdi, supra note 51, at 1.
59. Id.
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selective enforcement of sanctions threatens interbranch comity, which may
diminish the credibility of the American sanctions regime at home and abroad.
3. Non-govemmental Cooperation
Finally, voluntary cooperation by regulated communities is critical to
effective enforcement of OFAC's sanctions program. After all, corporations
and private citizens are the actors at risk of engaging in banned financial
transactions and are therefore best able to implement safeguards and
proactively report violations. Fitzgerald goes so far as to argue that "voluntary
implementation and compliance with [OFAC] rules" is more crucial to
successful enforcement of sanctions than the agency enforcement actions
themselves.6 0 Yet for years, OFAC and the non-govemmental actors it
regulates have been at odds, driven in part by a sentiment in the private sector
that current regulations take little account of the needs of businesses. 61 In
response, the regulated community has balked at proactively assisting OFAC to
achieve its enforcement goals.
Having considered the major problems riddling the sanctions enforcement
regime, we turn next to our solutions. Our proposals offer novel approaches to
address resource constraints, inter-branch dynamics, and, most importantly, the
relationship between regulators and the private sector.
II. Solutions
A. Qui Tam Suits
1. The Rise and Fall (and Rise) of Qui Tam
With its origins in Roman criminal law, qui tam derives its name from an
abbreviation of the Latin phrase meaning "one who pursues the action on
behalf of the king as well as himself." 62 In broad terms, a qui tam provision
confers authority on individual citizens, labeled relators, to sue private parties
on behalf of the government. While qui tam provisions have historically
contemplated a variety of rewards, inherent in them is the principle that the
private citizen who initiated the suit is entitled to a portion of the judgment
upon successful prosecution.
A paradigmatic example of an American qui tam statute, the False Claims
Act (FCA),63 was enacted in 1863 to stem the pervasive frauds committed by
60. Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 964.
61. Id.
62. In full, the Latin phrase reads qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac
parte sequitur. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161. Roman law permitted private
citizens successful in their suits to share in the recovery of a defendant's property. Richard A. Bales, A
Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 381, 385 (2001).




Civil War defense contractors against the Union Army.6' As the number of
wartime claims mounted, so too did suspicions that government prosecutors
were complicit in many of the schemes defrauding the government. In
response, Congress turned to a dual-enforcement mechanism whereby private
actors would supplement public prosecutors feared to be systematically under-
enforcing the statute.65 To incentivize private actors, the original FCA
authorized double damages and awarded relators of successful suits half of any
damages and penalties paid in judgment. At the same time, the government
retained considerable enforcement power, as it was authorized by the statute to
assume control of the prosecution at any time for any reason.66
Following the Civil War, qui tam actions declined, due in part to changes
enacted to the FCA in 1943 that shrank the potential damage award to 10% of
the judgment amount. The 1980s, however, witnessed the reemergence of qui
tam suits amid public outcry over reports of rising procurement fraud and false
claims.6 1 Congress passed the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, which
increased the financial incentives for relators and ratcheted up penalties
imposed on defendants.6 8 The law authorized relators to receive reasonable
expenses and attorneys' fees.69 Defendants, on the other hand, faced treble
damages.70  Finally, the Act created a whistleblower provision to protect
employee-informants.n
Most relevant for purposes of this Note, the 1986 legislation considerably
restricted the government's ability to assume control of a qui tam suit.72 The
executive branch now has a sixty-day window from the time a relator files suit
to investigate the claim and decide whether to take over the prosecution. If the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") intervenes during that window, then it has broad
discretion over the case. The government may dismiss the suit, enter a
settlement, or limit the role of the relator in the prosecution. Yet even if the
government intervenes, the relator is entitled to receive between 15% and 25%
of any proceeds of the suit.74 On the other hand, if DOJ declines to assume
responsibility for the prosecution, its capacity to control the suit is curtailed: it
may only enter the case upon a showing of good cause.75 Moreover, DOJ's
64. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976).
65. See Bales, supra note 62, at 388-89; Evan Caminker, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE. L.J. 341, 351 (1989). In no way do we mean to suggest
that current prosecutors are associated with the perpetrators of fraud on the government.
66. Bales, supra note 62, at 389.
67. Id. at 389-90.
68. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153
(1986).
69. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
70. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 2, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012).
71. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 4, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012).
72. Of course, DOJ remains free to bring suit if it learns of a violation independently.
73. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (2012).
74. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012).
75. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, § 3, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012).
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participation cannot restrict the "status and rights" of the relator, a constraint
that has generated uncertainty about whether the government may dismiss a
suit when it intervenes after the statutory window.76
The FCA's qui tam provision has been extolled widely as a vital tool in
combating government fraud and achieving other policy aims.n Since the 1986
amendments to the FCA, over five thousand qui tam suit suits have been filed,
recouping over $17 billion from fraudulent contractors on behalf of the
government.
2. From Contracts to Sanctions: Mapping the FCA onto Sanctions Laws
Several of the justifications offered to support the qui tam provision in the
FCA apply with at least as much force to a statutory sanctions regime
buttressed by private enforcement. First, in its discussion of the 1986
amendments, the Senate insisted that fraud by defense contractors presented a
threat not only to the public fisc, but to national security as well. If national
security is credited as a legitimate aim of qui tam suits in the contracting
context, the case for private enforcement would seem to apply all the more
strongly to the sanctions regime.
Second, qui tam suits have proven particularly useful in rooting out
fraudulent medical assistance claims submitted to the government, a trend
attributable in part to traits of the medical industry also shared by the financial
services industries. The government relies heavily on private relators in the
medical field because DOJ's capacity to investigate is limited by statutes
protecting, among other things, patient privacy.80 For sanctions violations
perpetrated by international companies, international privacy laws may
similarly limit DOJ's reach. Another parallel between medical claims and
sanctions violations is the sheer number of transactions at issue. While DOJ
may have the resources to review government contracts, it is ill equipped to
scrutinize the flood of medical claims submitted under the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.8' Likewise, the Attorney General cannot police every U.S.
76. Bales concedes that at least one interpretation would hold the government to be
prohibited entirely from terminating a suit in this circumstance. He notes, however, that most courts
have suggested in dicta that the government could move to dismiss the suit notwithstanding its late
arrival to the prosecution. Bales, supra note 62, at 429.
77. See e.g., PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION
OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONs THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 178 (2007)
(noting the reduction in agency costs); Sean Hamer, Lincoln's Law: Constitutional and Policy Issues
Posed by Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 101-02 (1997)
(claiming that the benefits to society of qui tam suits outweigh any potential constitutional
uncertainties).
78. VERKUIL, supra note 77, at 178.
79. S. Rep. No. 99-345; see also Caminker, supra note 65, at 349 ("Financial concerns
aside, false claims practices may generate other diffuse injuries, including threats to national security.").
80. Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 983 (2007).




dollar transaction that may run afoul of sanctions. Finally, physicians, like
citizens engaging in private financial transactions, exercise a great degree of
autonomy,82 suggesting that only those close to a perpetrator may be able to
detect wrongdoing. Unlike government prosecutors stationed in Washington
and responsible for monitoring millions of transactions originating miles away,
employees and competitors of malfeasant companies have easier access to on-
the-ground evidence of wrongdoing.
The third, and perhaps most compelling, justification for introducing a qui
tam provision to sanctions enforcement relates to timing. Timing concerns are
of utmost importance in enforcing sanctions: even a few weeks of undetected
violations could mean that significant sums of money are funneled to terroristic
regimes. And yet, it may take months, if not years, for prosecutors to detect a
pattern of prohibited transactions, let alone to build a case against sanctions
violators. Federal enforcement actions are largely reactive, built from voluntary
disclosures regarding high-value transactions.83  Furthermore, even if
prosecutors were to launch an affirmative investigation, they experience
significant delays as target companies respond to subpoenas, or worse, seek to
evade them.
With a few small but significant alterations, a sanctions regime
incorporating private enforcement could emulate the FCA model. First, IEEPA
would have to be amended to contain a qui tam provision permitting actions to
be brought by private persons in addition to the executive branch. To screen
against frivolous lawsuits, Congress might consider imposing a minimum
transaction amount upon which a suit can be based. Then again, requiring
relators to bear at least the initial costs of litigation probably serves as an
adequate safeguard against frivolous suits. Second, as our sanctions regime
implicates national security and diplomatic concerns to a far greater degree
than does government contract fraud, restrictions on the government's ability to
control relator-initiated prosecutions necessarily must be scaled back. Invoking
the state secrets doctrine and national security concerns, the Attorney General
should have no trouble meeting the "good cause" requirement to enter a suit
past the sixty-day statutory window. Still, to be practicable, a looser good-cause
standard must also be coupled with the government's ability to constrain "the
status and rights" of the private litigant, even if the DOJ intervenes past he
statutory window. Finally, as with the FCA, private suits brought under IEEPA
would require a showing that the defendant acted at least with the knowledge of
his or her illicit activity. 84 To treat sanctions violations as strict liability
offenses would not only invite a barrage of private suits, each of which the
82. Id.
83. See Part I.c.i, supra.
84. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012) (imposing liability on only those persons who
knowingly or intentionally file false claims against the government). As mentioned above, IEEPA's
criminal penalties apply only to those people who knowingly violate the law. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c)
(2012).
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government would be obligated to investigate, but also deprive defendants of
any number of the good-faith defenses that the government considers when
deciding ex ante whether to prosecute a sanctions violator.
A brief hypothetical may help to illustrate how qui tam actions against
sanctions violators might work. Suppose a compliance officer at the American
arm of a major international ship brokerage house realizes that her employer
has knowingly conducted several transactions with a shell company operated
by Iran's national shipping line. She has reported the wrongdoing to her
superiors to no avail. Armed with records of several incriminating wire
transfers as well as emails making clear her superiors' complicity in the illicit
transactions, the compliance officer initiates a lawsuit, which, if successful,
would entitle her to up to 30% of the judgment awarded to the government as
well as reimbursement for reasonable attorneys' fees. Should the government
intervene and assume primary responsibility for the suit, the relator would still
be entitled to receive between 15% and 25% of any proceeds.85
The most natural objection to a qui tam provision in IEEPA focuses on
national security: namely, sanctions are meant to be a tool of foreign policy
entrusted exclusively to the President. To this argument we offer two
counterclaims. First, as discussed above, should any national security concerns
surface past the statutory window during which the DOJ may take control of
the investigation automatically, the hurdles for the government to reenter the
case would necessarily be lower than those presented in the FCA context.
Invocation of the state secrets privilege or the President's Article II powers to
conduct foreign policy would constitute the "good cause" requisite for
resumption of government control. Second, the Supreme Court has already
upheld statutory schemes in which Congress subordinates national security
concerns and circumscribes executive control to promote its interest in vigorous
and timely prosecutions.86
Accompanying the national security concerns unique to private
enforcement of sanctions are concerns generic to all qui tam suits. For instance,
some argue that since private suits appeal to individuals' greed and self-
aggrandizement, relators driven by dollar signs are unable to take into account
broader government interests.87 Other detractors insist that private suits saddle
companies with high litigation costs that would be better spent conducting
85. One could construct a similar hypothetical substituting a business competitor or
customer for the dissatisfied employee. For a breakdown of relator "types" bringing suit under the FCA,
see David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1296 tbl.3 (2012).
86. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, the Court upheld the qui tam provision of
the False Claims Act, rejecting the Attorney General's pleas that private suits would damage the war
effort. 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943). Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court overrode national security
and foreign policy concerns to approve an enforcement scheme charging a court-appointed prosecutor,
insulated from presidential control, with investigating high-ranking executive officials. 487 U.S. 654,
654-68 (1988). For a thorough discussion of the Court's consideration of competing interests, see
Caminker, supra note 65, at 366.




internal investigations.88 Still others criticize qui tam suits for their capacity to
function as a tool of retribution among business competitors.89 In response to
the last criticism, we note that qui tam suits harness economic incentives that
already exist among business competitors, and for this reason may be
understood to be as much a feature as a bug. Moreover, if the enforcement
mechanism is well devised, only those enterprises running afoul of sanctions
need be concerned.
Proponents of qui tam suits in the contracting context have defended the
merits of private enforcement against these and other criticisms.90 As such, we
will not rehash their arguments. Rather, we offer next a solution that engages
the private sector without dramatically increasing private citizens' control over
sanctions enforcement.
B. Bounties
If the risks incurred by a public-private prosecution scheme ultimately
prove too great, the government need not wholly abandon the notion of
enlisting private actors to strengthen sanctions enforcement. Rather than confer
a right of action, IEEPA and other sanctions laws can simply be amended to
create a bounty system for private informers.
Like qui tam suits, bounty provisions have a long history in federal
statutes, covering conduct ranging from bribery and conflicts-of-interest to
the recovery of undersea treasure.92 Apart from their utility as a supplemental
enforcement tool and a catalyst for innovation, bounty provisions also serve a
cost-cutting function, a particularly attractive prospect in the current cash-
strapped climate. Indeed, President Obama stressed the potential for cost
savings in a March 2010 memorandum urging agencies to increase their use of
challenges and prizes to promote national goals.93 Further, unlike with qui tam
actions, bounties enable the government to retain total control over its
enforcement agenda: the government is free to announce larger prizes for
information about violations of high priority sanctions, while attaching no
bounties to less urgent sanctions. To add more color to this picture, next we
outline two hypothetical bounty regimes.
88. Id.
89. Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1277-78. Among other common critiques of qui tam
suits, Engstrom lists dominance of the plaintiffs' bar by former DOJ prosecutors. Id. at 1285.
90. Broderick, supra note 80, at 962-63.
91. Bales, supra note 62, at 387 n.37 (collecting statutes that contain bounties).
92. Bales, supra note 62, at 388 n.40 (same).
93. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
MEMORANDUM No. 10-11, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF CHALLENGES AND PRIZES TO PROMOTE OPEN
GOVERNMENT (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010
/ml0-l l.pdf. We thank Professor Jon Michaels for directing us to this source. See Jon D. Michaels,
Privatization's Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1058 (2013) (listing government-sponsored prizes a a
type of "[g]overnment-by-bounty initiative[]").
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1. Investigative Clearinghouses
Borrowing from Jon Michaels' case study of social-impact bonds,9 4 we
offer a rough sketch of how enforcement-by-bounty can bolster the current
sanctions regime. On a basic level, social-impact bonds involve the government
enlisting "bond organizations," which are responsible for designating and
funding other private organizations to accomplish various social-service
initiatives. While the bond organizations absorb all up-front and operational
costs, upon reaching certain benchmarks, they are reimbursed by the
government and rewarded with additional bonuses.95 Applying this blueprint to
sanctions enforcement, the government can recoup many of the same cost-
cutting and innovation-inducing benefits by giving bond organizations
responsibility for locating and incentivizing private actors to gather information
about real-time sanctions violations. Major U.S. corporate investigation firms
could fill the role of bond organizations, paying the up-front costs of recruiting
private actors with whom they already have relationships. In turn, these private
actors-ranging from U.S. grain traders, to German banks, to British insurance
underwriters-would collect routine fees for supplying to the investigative
firms intelligence about suspicious transactions or sanctioned counterparties
seeking to initiate business with them. Serving as information clearinghouses,
the bond organizations would then be responsible for compiling, analyzing, and
reporting suspicious activity to the government. Upon meeting certain
benchmarks, such as names added to the OFAC list or transaction-dollars
saved, the government would repay the clearinghouses their initial investment
plus a bounty pegged to the dollar amount of illegal transactions reported.
If substantial bonuses fail to ensure participation among investigative
firms, the government may turn to other incentives.96 Namely, the government
can promise participating investigation firms priority review for lucrative
government contracts in other areas of investigation. As the cost of losing
priority review increases, non-participating firms will face the choice of either
joining the government's sanctions-investigation program or paying what
Michaels describes as a "tax" equal to "the cost of purchasing a priority-review
voucher on the open market."97
2. Financial Institutions
Financial institutions represent the most valuable repository of
information about suspicious financial transactions. They not only clear
hundreds of millions' worth of U.S. dollars each day, but also retain detailed
94. Michaels, supra note 93, at 1052.
95. Id. at 1052-53.
96. Id. at 1077. Michaels discusses coercive bounties to spur development of
treatments for diseases afflicting third-world countries.




financial and personal information about accountholders.98 Since banks and
their employees may not be disposed to initiate qui tam suits as relators,99
financial institutions present especially attractive candidates for bounties. At
the same time, their participation may be rather difficult to ensure given the
norms of confidentiality and discretion that have long governed the banking
industry, particularly in non-U.S. markets.
Despite, or perhaps because of, their persistent commitment to ensuring
clients' privacy, banks are subject to reporting requirements under the Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA).o00 Briefly, the BSA obliges financial institutions to keep
records of cash purchases, report any cash transactions exceeding $10,000, and
file suspicious activity reports (SARs) alerting the government to possible tax
evasion, money laundering, or otherwise criminal behavior, including sanctions
evasion or terrorist financing.'o In 2001, the PATRIOT Act strengthened
several money-laundering controls, increasing banks' obligations to monitor
and report foreign correspondent banks and private accounts.102 Failure to file
SARs can expose banks to civil penalties up to the transaction amount, with
fines increasing if failure to file is found to be a willful.1 0 3
Currently, the BSA reporting scheme contemplates both a negative and
positive bounty for financial institutions. Focusing on the former, banks whose
SARs are sufficiently comprehensive and judiciously filed are unlikely to be
the target of a government investigation and civil fines (for BSA violations),
which recently have reached upwards of $450 million.' 0 4 If avoidance of these
fines represents significant savings (i.e., a negative bounty), it is puzzling why
banks continue to violate BSA reporting requirements. Though we can only
speculate about the complex risk calculus that banks assess when designing
98. Before opening accounts for new clients, banks conduct rigorous background
investigations, performing Know Your Customer (KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) checks.
See, e.g., Know Your Customer & Anti Money Laundering - Customer Awareness, CREDIT SUISSE
GROUP AG (last visited July 23, 2014), https://www.credit-suisse.com/in/investmentbanking/doc
/important info/amlkycguidelines.pdf; Account Opening and KYC, STANDARD CHARTERED (last
visited July 23, 2014), https://www.sc.com/in/important-information/kyc.html.
99. Given the near-daily news coverage of major financial institutions involved in
litigation surrounding the 2008 financial crisis, it would be unsurprising if banks informally discouraged
employees from embroiling themselves or the banks in any voluntary lawsuits.
100. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332 (2012).
101. FinCEN's Mandate from Congress, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T.
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes-regs/bsa/ (last visited June 6, 2014); see also Matthew R. Hall, Note, An
Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering and the Suspicious Activity
Report, 643 KY. L.J. 651-53 (1995).
102. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 277, §§ 312-314 (2001).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
104. In January 2014, J.P. Morgan paid a $461 million fine for failing to report
suspicious activity connected to Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme. JPMorgan Admits Violation of the
Bank Secrecy Act for Failed Madoff Oversight; Fined $461 Million by FinCEN, FINCEN (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.fincen.gov/newsroom/nr/html/20140107.html. In December 2012, the DOJ levied a $500
million civil penalty against HSBC Bank for facilitating sanctioned transactions. HSBC Holdings Plc.
and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256
Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, JUSTICE DEP'T. (Dec. I, 2012), http://www.justice.gov
/opalpr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html.
579
Yale Journal on Regulation
procedural safeguards to monitor suspicious financial transactions, it seems
safe to assume that too often they conclude that the benefits of retaining
lucrative, if not totally aboveboard, clients outweigh the slim possibility of
paying a civil fine years down the road. The same can certainly be said for
small businesses for which the low risk of prosecution does not overcome the
considerable costs of implementing safeguards to catch one-off transactions.05
To remedy this imbalance, Congress should consider increasing the negative
bounty awarded to compliant banks by raising the amount and frequency of
penalties levied against bad actors.
Any increase in investigations and settlements demands a concomitant
increase in resources, but the government can conserve costs by deploying
private actors to report BSA violations and by rewarding them for original
information that leads to a criminal fine or civil penalty (i.e. increase the
positive bounty). Federal regulations already authorize the Treasury Secretary
to reward informants the lesser of $150,000 or 25% of the fine or penalty.106
Yet, this provision has received scant attention, and there is little reason to
believe that either the government or private citizens are taking advantage of
it. 10 7 Perhaps it remains unknown to most bank employees' 0 or its offer of
reward is too insignificant to outweigh the costs, such as the effort of reporting
the violation, the risk of job loss, or reputational harm.109 Whatever the reason,
the government can reinvigorate the bounty provision with minimal effort.
First, Congress can increase the reward amount to offset the risks, both
reputational and financial, of reporting. Second, it can encourage reporting with
a modest outreach campaign that highlights the protections offered to
whistleblowersi"o and underscores the close connection between sanctions-
violating transactions and terrorist acts.
Apart from enforcement costs, critics of our bounty regime might stress
national security concerns similar to those raised by qui tam suits, as well as the
hurdles to enlisting banks' participation. Like our qui tam solutions, our bounty
solutions introduce private citizens into the traditionally public domains of
foreign diplomacy and national security. However, unlike qui tam provisions,
105. Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 980.
106. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.930 (authorizing the Treasury Secretary to reward any
"individual who provides original information which leads to a recovery of a criminal fine, civil penalty,
or forfeiture, which exceeds $50,000, for a violation of [the BSA]").
107. A Westlaw search reveals only two citing references.
108. Cf Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 978 (discussing the minimal attention given to
OFAC's enforcement activity).
109. The BSA contains whistleblower protections preventing discrimination against or
dismissal of any employee who provides information to the Treasury about violations of the BSA. 31
U.S.C. § 5328 (2012). However, the shortcomings of federal whistleblower protections are well
documented. See, e.g., Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 67 (2007); Robert J.
McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers 3 WM. & MARY POL'Y REv. 184,
186-88 (2012).




which enable private citizens to initiate litigation potentially at odds with DOJ
interests, the private bounty scheme reserves for the government the exclusive
power of prosecution and compensation.
As to the question of whether financial institutions would participate in a
bounty scheme, we acknowledge the obvious difficulties in asking banks to
engage in prophylactic enforcement efforts. For one thing, these banks may be
headquartered in countries hostile to U.S. sanctions. As a result, they may
prove reluctant to antagonizing lucrative clients and correspondent banks in
suspect countries, even at the expense of disrepute in America."' While we
predict that hese obstacles can be overcome, we concede that success depends
in large measure on sizable increases in both the negative and positive bounties
available.
C. Third-Party Ratings Systems
The final two solutions we consider are "free-market" enforcement
mechanisms that would provide economic incentives for private enterprise to
participate in sanctions enforcement. Such solutions, while substantively
restricting free trade as any sanctions enforcement mechanism would,
nonetheless could appear more politically palatable to interest groups
predisposed to support trade liberalization because of their reliance on the
private sector.
The first idea borrows a page from our domestic financial regulatory
system, which relies heavily on third-party for-profit ratings agencies. Here, we
consider the possibility of Congress chartering for-profit entities that rate the
sanctions compliance of various financial institutions.
1. The Incentive Structures of Private-Sector Rating Agencies
First, we discuss the economics of modem credit rating agencies so that
we can apply the model to sanctions enforcement. Despite their well-
documented failings during the financial crisis, credit rating agencies remain an
integral pillar of modem financial markets. The model is simple enough:
efficient markets require perfect information, but information has costs.112 Not
every investor can scrutinize the detailed financial statements for every stock or
bond that they might consider. In order to make smart decisions, investors pay
for concise information about the creditworthiness and financial position of
firms in which they invest. In the United States, an entire industry focuses on
Ill. Cf Michaels, supra note 2, at 917 (noting backlash from global financial
institutions toward U.S. intelligence-gathering efforts).
112. John Kiff et al., Are Ratings Agencies Powerful? An Investigation into the Impact
and Accuracy of Sovereign Ratings (IMF Working Paper No. 12/23, 2012), http://www.economy.gov.ae
/Arabic/DocLib/IMF%20Working%20Paper_CRAs_2012.pdf.
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rating the creditworthiness of various firms.113 A few rating agencies-
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch-have earned enough credibility in the
markets that investors are likely to invest in only those securities that these
agencies have rated. In order to attract investors, the issuers of such securities
are willing to pay the agencies to rate them. The agencies profit, while the
market benefits from streamlined information."14
Besides their information benefits, rating agencies also provide the
markets with monitoring benefits. Ratings are not fixed; they are revised
periodically as a stock or bond's credit characteristics evolve. Accordingly, the
prospect of improving its rating encourages a firm to improve its own
creditworthiness.'"5 Those two benefits of rating agencies-information and
monitoring-will be useful when applying the agencies' model to sanctions
enforcement.
Of course, this very business model has been blamed as one of the root
causes of the 2008 financial crisis." 6 The chief criticism has been that since
issuers themselves generally pay for the ratings, the agencies are incentivized to
issue favorable ratings. Furthermore, critics assert that there was never any
market mechanism to hold the agencies accountable for inaccurate ratings.' 1
Indeed, the lack of any public or private mechanism to ensure that higher-rated
borrowers were actually less risky than lower-rated borrowers has generated the
criticism that ratings agencies "ended up compromising the quality of their
activities in order to facilitate the selling of services, and snatch or defend
market shares.""8 We agree that both criticisms are valid and so evaluate them
in the system for sanctions enforcement proposed below.
2. A Third-Party Rating Agency System for Sanctions Compliance
The same two problems that plague credit rating agencies also undermine
sanctions compliance: a lack of information and a lack of monitoring. Financial
market participants face the threat of "sanctions risk," the risk of dealing with a
firm that violates sanctions. Because financial institutions are highly sensitive
113. Id.
114. Alexander B. Mattheis, Empirical Research on Corporate Credit Ratings: A
Literature Review, SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2013-003 (2013), http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers
/pdf/SFB649DP2013-003.pdf.
115. See, e.g., Christina E. Bannier & Christian Hirsch, The Economic Function of
Credit Rating Agencies: What Does the Watchlist Tell Us? (2009), http://www.frankfurt-school.de
/clicnetclm/fileDownload.do?goid=000000228495AB4 (cataloguing a broad array of criticisms of credit
ratings agencies and their role in the global financial crisis, including those cited here).
116. See, e.g., Elliott Blair Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street as Rating Agencies Let
Loose Subprime Scourge, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.con/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=ah8391WTLP9s.
117. Id.
118. Mauro Bussani, Credit Rating Agencies' Accountability: Short Notes on a Global
Issue (Aug. 27, 2011) at *1, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1515285 (Working Paper). An earlier




to the risk that their counterparties may violate sanctions,"9 institutions will
prefer compliant counterparties.
As detailed in Part II above, the magnitude of sanctions risk is poorly
understood because government enforcement agencies are under-resourced and
ill-equipped to handle the massive volume of alleged sanctions violations.1 20
Those same resource constraints also preclude the government from effectively
encouraging compliance through readily available and accessible public
communication.
If private sector firms were to dedicate themselves to performing audits of
financial institutions, both of these problems could be addressed, at least
partially. As with credit rating agencies, "sanctions compliance rating
agencies" (hereinafter SCRAs) could dedicate their resources to auditing the
compliance procedures of financial institutions. If the SCRAs had sufficient
credibility in the markets, counterparties would prefer to deal with SCRA-rated
firms because such dealings would involve less (or at least better understood)
sanctions risk. Accordingly, financial institutions would be willing to pay to be
rated. This arrangement would transfer the costs of information and monitoring
to the financial institutions being monitored and would more efficiently
distribute risk. Meanwhile, banks themselves would pay for the costs that risky
behavior creates.
The benefits of this system, though, are not just economic. This system
would strengthen American foreign policy not only by making sanctions
effective, but also by aligning the enforcement tools with the private-sector-
driven economic values so dear to American interests abroad. American
interests in global trade negotiations and global financial regulatory
negotiations will be strengthened if the United States can show its partners that
its foreign policy is aligned with its economic values. In the absence of a
private-sector enforcement mechanism, the presence of stringent sanctions
regimes administered solely by the state is in some political tension with the
appearance of the United States' private-sector driven economy. The use of
private ratings agencies is one form of "free market foreign policy" whereby
the United States can achieve its broader foreign policy goals through effective
sanctions enforcement driven by the private sector.
The difficult practical question is how such a system could get off the
ground and build credibility. If the SCRAs are not credible, banks will have
minimal incentive to pay for a rating. A bank would prefer not to open its
financial information and pay to be rated unless it faces the risk of some
economic loss for not doing so. In the world of credit rating agencies, the
agencies' established market credibility provides incentive for issuers to allow
119. OFAC Compliance in the Securities and Investment Sector, 13 J. INVESTMENT
COMPLIANCE 21, 21 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/Emerald
OFACArticle.pdf("[R]obust communication of a firm's OFAC obligations to its clients, affiliates, or
counterparties to a transaction can mitigate OFAC risk.").
120. See Jurdi, supra note 51, at 1.
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themselves to be rated: the market will suspect that an unrated issuer or
instrument is not creditworthy. We need to create a similar presumption for
SCRAs.
Accordingly, we recommend that the government charter SCRAs, at least
initially. Under such a system, financial regulators could promulgate a rule
requiring that counterparties deal with SCRA-rated firms for transactions of a
certain size or character. In fact, the government already requires that certain
financial transactions be handled only by firms with active credit ratings in
particular narrow circumstances.121 Such a state-chartered system could
function as a substitute for the "credibility" that credit rating agencies have
already earned.
Of course, such public sector involvement might negate one of the chief
benefits of private-sector sanctions enforcement: alleviating the government's
financial burden. While this is an empirical question that the analysis of such a
rule should undertake, public sector involvement under this proposal is of a
materially different kind than that required by active enforcement. The public
sector here has an expressive function: it confers the credibility of the state on
the SCRA. Such expression has administrative costs, but because the rated
firms would largely fund the agencies, the substantial costs of sanctions
enforcement will have been effectively shifted to the regulated private sector,
promoting cost internalization. This might not be free for the state, but it shifts
the primary cost burden onto those at risk of violating sanctions.
Others might observe that the Dodd-Frank Act removes references to
credit ratings agencies from a number of federal regulations,122 which militates
against public approval or disapproval of a private ratings schema. Indeed, we
believe that our proposal would also function best as a purely private endeavor;
the difficulty we address with this public mechanism is the novelty of the
SCRA market. The major national credit ratings agencies are-despite recent
criticism-well-established and well-recognized. We invoke a small measure
of public assistance here in order to support the nascent SCRA industry, and
would hope that it might withdraw should the market become more established.
Would our SCRA model run any of the same risks that plagued rating
agencies during the financial crisis? Rating agencies were blamed as
contributors to the financial crisis for two primary reasons: first, the agencies'
incentives were misaligned since the companies they were rating paid them.123
Second, there was no mechanism other than the free market for ensuring the
121. Overview of SEC Regulations Surrounding Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-34616.pdf.
122. See, e.g., Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 71194, 79 Fed. Reg. 1522 (Jan. 8, 2014).
123. See Maurice R. Greenberg, Yes, but Eliminate Their Conflicts and Have Them





ratings were accurate, and the free market failed to do so.'24 At first glance,
similar problems might occur here: who will monitor the monitors? And if
banks are paying, won't the SCRAs be biased to give positive ratings?
Public sector involvement can help address those criticisms. The
government can structure the market so that SCRAs have an incentive to
compete for accuracy, not for the favor of the firms they are rating. This could
be accomplished in a number of ways. The federal government could pay
bonuses to SCRAs whose ratings prove especially accurate (as measured by
giving high ratings to firms with no compliance issues and low ratings to firms
that violate sanctions). Public support, in this case, would be limited to
providing the financial incentive to perform well according to some objectively
constrained criteria, such as-for example-never awarding the top rating to a
firm penalized for a sanctions violation. The public sector would not be making
any enforcement decisions in providing this bonus, so such a schema would not
undermine the private character of SCRA behavior. It would only better align
that private behavior with public values.
Alternatively, the government could impose negative penalties on
agencies that do the opposite. Such ideas would shift the incentive structure for
firms in favor of accuracy. Firms would still have an incentive to evade
sanctions to the extent that the rewards of dealing with sanctioned parties
exceed the cost of punishment times the probability of detection. But private
rating agencies will have incentives to effectively establish accurate ratings in a
way that government law enforcement agents, whose compensation does not
depend upon effectiveness, does not.
To be sure, this model has other risks. First Amendment concerns make
the regulation of such agencies difficult because regulating the content of their
ratings could be considered a limit on the agencies' freedom of expression.'2 5
And while state chartering could impair the credibility on which current rating
agencies rely, we lack empirical evidence to establish that this is true in
practice. 126Overall, however, this idea merits further study because of its
foreign policy and economic benefits.
D. Enforcement Risk-Pooling Through "Sanctions Insurance"
Our fourth solution involves the chartering of private insurance companies-
empowered to pool risk and sell insurance for unintentional, non-criminal
sanctions violations. Because most international regimes impose strict liability
on violators without regard to any scienter standard, the complexity of the
124. See Haral MalmGren, Yes, but Increased Oversight Is Essential, in Do the Credit
Rating Agencies Deserve to Exist?, supra note 123.
125. See generally Caleb Deats, Note, Talk That Isn't Cheap: Does the First
Amendment Protect Credit Rating Agencies' Faulty Methodologies from Regulation, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1818 (2010).
126. Kiff, supra note 90.
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regulations and the opacity of ownership of many international financial
institutions have given rise to several instances where firms have been held
liable for unknowingly violating sanctions.'27 For example, one could be held
liable for dealing with an international financial institution with a complex
ownership structure and performing insufficient research to discover that the
beneficial owner was an Iranian national; or accidentally paying life insurance
benefits to a next-of-kin, without knowledge that the next of kin was a Cuban
national.12 8 Any firm risks violating sanctions unknowingly, even those with
the best intentions. This creates a new risk for financial institutions, imposed on
the market by sanctions regimes. Our proposed solution seeks to pool this
"sanctions risk" across the industry. This solution is the most speculative of the
four proposed here, and it requires the most radical shift away from the
conventional understanding of sanctions enforcement. But it is also the
solution, we believe, that bears the greatest upside for the domestic and foreign
goals of sanctions implementation. Before we delve into the mechanics of how
our risk-pooling regime might function practically, we consider the specific
foreign policy goals best served by risk pooling.
1. Punish Sanctions Targets, not Domestic Actors
First, substantive discussions of sanctions enforcement often lose sight of
the fact that sanctions do not exist to punish domestic financial firms. Sanctions
exist to punish nations that the American government has deemed to be
inappropriate trading partners. The idea is to make Iran's economy suffer so
that Iran curtails its nuclear program, not to squeeze J.P. Morgan's bottom line.
Whatever banks may think to the contrary,'29 the United States only punishes
the banks insofar as their non-compliance weakens the government's
punishment of foreign nations. The primary goal remains the infliction of
economic cost on other nations. The compliance costs that domestic financial
firms face as a result of sanctions regimes are collateral damage. They are not a
goal of U.S. foreign policy.' 3 0 International banks, for example, scrambled to
comply with the sanctions against Russia announced in the summer of 2014 as
Moscow's aggressive behavior in Ukraine persisted. While the first-order goal
127. For a catalogue of recent examples of unintentional sanctions violations, see
Vincent J. Vitkowski & Stephen G. Huggard, The Insurance Industry and OFAC Economic Sanctions,
EDWARDS ANGELL PALMER & DODGE (2011).
128. Id.
129. For a discussion of the current climate of hostility between regulators and the
regulated community, see Part I.C.iii, supra.
130. Admittedly, since the 2008 financial crisis, there have been domestic political
benefits to regulations that impose costs, or appear to impose costs, on Wall Street financial entities. See
generally JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: How INTEGRITY HAS BEEN
DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013). Indeed, the fact that the domestic costs of sanctions have been
focused on financial institutions has likely provided much of the political cover for the imposition of
post-crisis financial sanctions on Iran, Russia, and others. However, as described at length in Part 1,




of these sanctions is to inflict economic pain on Russia for deterrence and
punishment, the existing policy prescription is placing immediate short-term
costs on banks. Economic sanctions, in other words, always face inwards too.
Second, the problem is not limited to the fact that domestic banks are
facing economic compliance costs for problems they did not create. The fact
that sanctions are under-enforced-and that banks may be able to profitably
evade them in certain circumstances-undermines the true foreign policy goals
of economic sanctions. Rational actors in Tehran and Moscow can observe that
threatened sanctions are not always executed. Under-enforcement fails to
punish non-compliant banks, but worse, it signals to foreign sanction targets
that sanctions are not economically relevant.131
2. Liability Insurance
Accordingly, we need a solution that (1) increases enforcement but (2)
refocuses on the punishment of foreign sanctions targets rather than the
punishment of domestic banks. We recommend shifting from a sanctions
enforcement system that assigns fault and liability to domestic financial
institutions toward a system of collective responsibility for the cost of
unintentional sanctions violations. In other words, we seek a transition from a
criminal-style enforcement regime that assigns liability according to fault
toward a system that assigns liability to the aggregate.
Pooled insurance is one such scheme. Our recommended system would
operate much like modem liability insurance for motorists. All parties at risk of
a violation would pay into a common fund. When the government identifies a
violation, the fund would pay, not the violator. The insurance scheme would
shift our way of thinking about unintentional violations toward an "accidents
happen" model. We would not assign societal shame or specific punishment on
any particular violator, but on the aggregate through a common fund. This is
the general approach to assigning negligence liability frequently advocated by
Guido Calabresi in his seminal 1970 work, The Costs of Accidents.132 For
instances where assigning liability to the entire pool minimizes aggregate costs,
insurance funds can be more efficient than specialized criminal-style deterrence
schemes.
As with the modem liability insurance model, it is critical that fund
payments be limited to unintentional sanctions violations. Otherwise, the
insurance scheme could have the perverse effect of encouraging violations
because it removes the threat of punishments. Absent such a limitation, the
131. Of course, in some circumstances the American diplomatic goals might
necessitate conveying the impression that sanctions are becoming less important. In such a
circumstance, the benefits of the systems we propose here are less impactful, along with any mechanism
that sought to increase the effectiveness of sanctions enforcement.
132. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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scheme would incentivize active fraud to a degree that would offend criminal
law theorists. Bentham and Kant agree on this much: insuring away criminal
liability fails to provide for optimal deterrence and would eliminate any notion
of rights-based culpability.
Furthermore, the fund should not provide unlimited insurance for
violations. Some incentive not to recklessly violate the parameters of the
sanctions regime, or, in more familiar terms, to remain a "safe driver," must be
maintained. The insurance cannot incentivize carelessness or intentional
wrongdoing, or it will fail to appropriately enforce the sanctions regime.
Accordingly, only some fixed amount of liability for unintentional sanctions
should be an insurable interest. The insurable interest should be large enough to
cover the size of typical unintentional sanctions violations frequently observed
in the market while small enough to keep offending companies on the hook for
larger transgressions. One initial estimate might place this at roughly half the
largest sanctions violation liabilities, at roughly $100 million. Each
participating bank would insure its first $100 million of cumulative sanctions
liability, but any further liability would not be insurable. Alternatively-and
extending the analogy to automobile insurance-the concept of "deductibles,"
by which insured firms would be liable for initial violations but not beyond
some limit, can also be helpful here. One drawback of a deductible-based
system, however, is that once the insured party has paid the deductible in full,
there is no further marginal deterrence. Both options, however, share the same
underlying deterrence-based logic, seeking to pool most risk while internalizing
some residual risk with the insured.
Of course, even a liability cap of the sort contemplated would still be
subject to some moral hazard: a firm that has never committed a sanctions
violation would still know that it has $100 million of "consequence-free"
transgression ahead of it, to continue the example above. However, we posit
that this cost-a less-than-optimal incentive for small violations-is likely to
be worth the benefits. Moreover, the liability cap could be sized dynamically in
response to the size of the insured firm, in order to avoid gross mismatches
between firm size and liability cap. As discussed more thoroughly in Part I,
sanctions regimes are designed to inflict economic pain on sanctioned
countries, not on the private business sector of the nation that applies the
sanctions. That implies that the largest transactions are the most important, and
the rational designer of a sanctions regime should accept some reduced
deterrence of small violations in favor of more effective deterrence of large
violations. And of course, while banks would face less of a disincentive to
violate sanctions, they would face no incentive to conceal them, improving the
enforcement regime.
This insurance program supports the notion that banks that commit
unintentional sanctions violations are not at fault in any sort of a criminal sense.
In the event such a violation were uncovered, a bank would file a claim against




insurable limit, the pool would cover the expense. Of course, a further issue for
exploration here is the incentive the schema would provide to firms who have*
committed intentional sanctions violations to cast those violations as
unintentional. An insurance schema might guard against this risk by
establishing bright-line standards for the sorts of clearly intentional violations
not intended to be insurable-such as activity from which the violating firm
benefited materially and abnormally. Truly "unintentional" violations are
unlikely to drive such windfalls.
The insurance schema would serve the twin foreign policy goals of
sanctions reform, improving enforcement and concentrating costs on sanctions
enforcement, more efficiently than the current system. First, under-enforcement
would become less of a problem, as banks would have no incentive to avoid ex
post detection for unintentional violations below the insurable interest
threshold. Banks themselves would become enforcement mechanisms.
Furthermore, the cost-spreading benefits of generalized liability insurance
would allow the collective financial industry to handle the costs with less
economic damage than if the costs were concentrated. Thus, the bulk of
sanctions' economic impact would be focused not on domestic banks, but on
the foreign targets.
Conclusion
Without robust enforcement, the American sanctions regime is a paper
tiger. Yet even as this danger looms in full view, sanctions continue to be
under-enforced and selectively enforced. Government agents charged with
investigating and prosecuting violations of sanctions meet roadblocks at every
turn, whether in the form of budget constraints or antagonism from regulated
communities. Recognizing the current obstacles to enforcement, as well as the
likelihood that American reliance on sanctions will continue to grow, we set
out to design four solutions that maximize sanctions enforcement and enhance
their economic efficiency. Specifically, we proposed introducing qui tam
provisions into our statutory sanctions regime, strengthening government
bounty programs, chartering sanctions compliance ratings agencies, and finally,
shifting to a liability insurance paradigm for sanctions costs.
Taken together, our solutions aim to solve the most significant problems
currently plaguing enforcement efforts. First, and most importantly, our
proposals enable the government to partner with the private sector to an
unprecedented degree, by implementing enforcement tactics that are
commercially viable and attuned to the demands of business. Aligning the
regulated community and the regulators as allies rather than adversaries, our
solutions enable the government to tap into the private sector's vast and vital
repository of information. Relatedly, utilizing the resources of the private
sector brings huge cost savings and helps alleviate the budget pressures
partially responsible for today's under-enforcement. Finally, our solutions
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assign an important role to Congress, thereby helping to reduce interbranch
dissension about enforcement priorities and adding a measure of oversight to
the executive branch.
The four proposals we presented here vary in their scope, their costs, and
their benefits. The largest divide is between our first two proposals, qui tam
provisions and bounties, and our other two proposals, a private sanctions
compliance ratings system and liability insurance for unintentional sanctions
violations. The first two proposals can be understood as incremental reforms to
the existing system, while the last two reflect a radical reimagining of the
current enforcement strategy that assigns a central role to the private sector.
All, however, recalibrate economic incentives to better execute foreign policy
goals. At the same time, they are all high risk. Each of the solutions places
considerable trust in market mechanisms to price sanctions risk and align
incentives in the proper manner. Yet, as many in the national security field
critical of pure economic analysis have duly observed, the free market does not
always work. Whether such a central role is appropriate for the private sector is
a deep democratic question that we do not address here. Among our four
solutions, private rating agencies and liability insurance remain aspirational
goals that will require considerable empirical study before implementation. Qui
tam provisions and bounties are more conservative proposals that policymakers
could execute without radical changes to the system.
Each of these solutions is subject to political constraints. The private
sector does not like to be regulated, and the imposition of a new enforcement
regime will provoke resistance among those who stand to lose from it. But the
scope of our reforms is such that the weight of political constraint is mitigated:
we do not propose new policies, merely new techniques of enforcement. The
only way that private-sector actors stand to lose is through an end to under-
enforcement. However, the claim that sanctions should remain under-enforced
is a difficult position to take. Moreover, "self-regulation" has historically
proved preferable to more onerous traditional regulatory regimes.133
These are not "slam dunk" solutions. There are unanswered questions and
the development of the details of any new enforcement regime will require
empirical analysis that extends beyond the scope of legal scholarship. But we
believe the balance of cost and benefit here demonstrates that further study
would be fruitful, especially as geopolitical developments draw sanctions back
into the limelight.
133. For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) oversees the
broker-dealer industry. Empirical data suggest that investors have traditionally found FINRA's decision-
making processes, such as those in the context of arbitration, sufficiently fair that they perceived no need
to seek out traditional public-sector fora. See Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?,
25 PACE L. REv. 1, 3 (2004).
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